investment💬 WhatsAppMay 20, 2026

Enveer

Successor to the Puth scheme, operated from the US and Australia. Turned Bhutanese bank accounts into an informal foreign currency black market using crypto as the settlement layer. Members paid Nu 95,000 for what should have cost Nu 84,650 at official rates.

The scheme that turned Bhutanese bank accounts into a foreign currency black market

Enveer surfaced in Bhutan in May 2024 as a successor to an earlier scheme called Puth, both of them apparently operated out of the United States. The Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority began investigating Enveer almost immediately, identifying it as the seventh similar pyramid scheme recorded that year alone. What makes Enveer particularly important to understand is not its returns structure, which was conventional, but the way it moved money. Enveer turned the personal bank accounts of Bhutanese members into an informal foreign currency exchange that operated entirely outside the Bhutanese banking system.

How it started

Enveer appeared after the earlier Puth scheme collapsed or moved on. Both were structured around the same recruitment model: invest, recruit, earn bonuses for both. The marketing used the language of cryptocurrency and online trading, but the underlying mechanics were Ponzi.

The investigative reporting that exposed Enveer documented the cross-border money flow in unusual detail. The Enveer chat group included Bhutanese members in both Bhutan and Australia. In the group, an active suspected administrator named "Gembo Tshering" operated from Australia, announcing bonus events and helping members in Bhutan set up Binance accounts. When members asked how much Ngultrum was required for a USD 1,000 "charge" on the platform, the answer was Nu 95,000, substantially above the official Bank of Bhutan rate of Nu 84.65 at the time.

That single number revealed the entire structure. Money was being deposited into local Bhutanese bank accounts at an inflated implied exchange rate. That money was then used by Bhutanese in Australia and elsewhere to buy foreign currency at rates above what the RMA and Bhutanese banks officially offered. The foreign currency was used to buy USDT and the USDT was sent back to the Bhutan-side participants, who held it on the platform with no real ability to withdraw.

In effect, Enveer was simultaneously running a Ponzi scheme and a parallel foreign currency black market that converted Ngultrum into USD at off-market rates, with cryptocurrency as the settlement layer. Bhutan was losing foreign currency to the scheme in measurable amounts, and Bhutanese citizens were paying a premium for the privilege.

What to watch for next time

First, when an investment platform asks you to deposit Ngultrum into a local Bhutanese personal account in exchange for credits denominated in dollars and the implied conversion rate is meaningfully different from the official Bank of Bhutan rate, you are not investing. You are participating in an informal foreign currency transaction outside legal channels.

Second, the cryptocurrency layer in Enveer was not a feature. It was the mechanism that made the operation possible. USDT cannot be frozen by Bhutanese authorities. The moment your funds are converted from Ngultrum into USDT held on a platform you do not control, they are effectively gone.

Third, the use of a foreign-based administrator is a deliberate jurisdictional choice. The person you are negotiating with does not live in the country where you can take legal action. This is by design, not by accident.

A note for those already affected

Enveer is harder to recover from than schemes with domestic operators, because the chain of custody runs through Australian personal accounts and cryptocurrency wallets. The most useful documentation is the chat record itself — the announcements, bank account details used for deposits, and any exchange rate discussions. Reporting to the CCAA and Royal Bhutan Police adds your case to a documented pattern.

Sources: The Bhutanese, Bhutan Broadcasting Service, CCAA of Bhutan, Royal Bhutan Police.

Red Flags

  • Deposits made into personal Bhutanese bank accounts, not a company account
  • Implied USD/Nu exchange rate significantly above official Bank of Bhutan rate
  • Foreign-based administrator (Australia/US) with no local legal presence
  • USDT used as settlement layer — funds leave Bhutanese regulatory reach immediately
  • Recruit-and-earn bonus structure identical to predecessor scheme Puth
  • Seventh pyramid scheme of the year — pattern is well-established

What to do if you were affected

Report to the Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority (CCAA) and the Royal Bhutan Police (113). Preserve the chat record in full — especially any messages showing bank account details used for deposits and exchange rate discussions. These are the most actionable evidence Bhutanese authorities can use.

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